ZO→FO hybrid optimizer achieves 100% ASR on indirect prompt injection in tool-using LLM agents
Auto-published from arXiv:2610.24823 by the mine-arxiv pipeline. Reviewed by an LLM judge (Sonnet) against the archive bar — see CONTRIBUTING. Notes: cleared review (confidence 0.93, no flags)
Category
indirect-prompt-injection
Model
Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct
Surface
agent harness (InjecAgent benchmark, 17 user tools / 62 attacker tools)
Setup
Adversarial strings (10-token prefix via ZO optimization + 15-token suffix via FO refinement, 25 tokens total, initialized with repeated 'x') are embedded inside tool response text returned to the agent. Example: a malicious traffic-light control instruction is injected into a calendar tool's response during a benign user scheduling query. When optimized, the agent calls the attacker-specified tool TrafficControlManageTrafficLightState instead of completing the legitimate task. Benchmark selects 50 cases per category (direct harm and data stealing). Temperature 0.7, top-p 0.9 used consistently during both optimization and evaluation.
Reproduction anchor
code: https://github.com/Hax1on/pair-aware.git; benchmark: InjecAgent (50 cases per category, direct harm + data stealing splits); exact adversarial string config and hyperparameters (search width 128, top-k 32, max steps 500) documented in paper body
Observed behavior
Agent abandons legitimate user task and calls attacker-specified tools (e.g., TrafficControlManageTrafficLightState). ZO→FO ordering achieves 100% ASR; the reversed FO→ZO ordering achieves only 55% ASR on the same benchmark, demonstrating that optimization order is a critical variable.
Expected behavior
Agent ignores injected adversarial text in tool responses and completes the user's legitimate task using the appropriate user tools.
Reproducibility
high
Threat model
An attacker who controls content returned by any external tool (web search results, calendar entries, emails, file contents) can inject optimized adversarial strings to fully redirect an LLM agent's actions in production deployments. With 100% ASR, any tool-using agent relying on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct is fully compromised whenever it ingests attacker-controlled content.
Novelty
First demonstration of 100% attack success rate on InjecAgent via hybrid zeroth-order/first-order optimization; reveals that optimizer ordering (ZO→FO vs FO→ZO) is itself a critical attack design choice, with the correct order nearly doubling ASR.
Source
- arXiv: 2610.24823
- PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.24823
- Categories: cs.LG, cs.AI
- Authors: Juanyang Xu, Zheng Wang, Xingyu Zhao, Siddartha Khastgir, Andi Zhang
Triage notes (auto)
- paperType:
red-team-vuln - estimatedCaseCount: 2
- triage reason: Systematic red-teaming paper proposing optimization-based jailbreak methods for LLM agents; demonstrates concrete attacks on malicious-instruction and malicious-environment benchmarks with reproducible adversarial prefix-suffix pairs.
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