SYS:ONLINELAT:n/aBUILD:78a79a3
[CASE-340]·STATUS:ACTIVE·OPENED:2026-11-03·UPDATED:2026-11-03

Sanitize-only filtering worsens triage attack success on Claude and Grok by destroying contextual severity evidence

submitted_by:@mexiQQ
from-arxivauto-publishedindirect-prompt-injection
cat case_body.md

Auto-published from arXiv:2611.02605 by the mine-arxiv pipeline. Reviewed by an LLM judge (Sonnet) against the archive bar — see CONTRIBUTING. Notes: cleared review (confidence 0.76, flags: [no-prompt-excerpt, possible-zero-day])

Category

indirect-prompt-injection

Model

Claude Opus 4.5, Grok 4 Fast, Gemini 3 Flash Preview, Qwen3-32B

Surface

agent harness (SOC alert triage workflow with sanitize-only defense layer)

Setup

The same poisoned SOC evidence bundles from the triage benchmark are passed through a sanitize-only pre-processor that scans evidence lines for injection-like fragments and removes matched text before the model call, but applies no severity-state policy post-generation. Sanitization uses fixed lexical predicates (described in Appendix G); no verbatim prompt or sanitizer rule-set is quoted in the body.

Reproduction anchor

Table 3 (triage ablation, all four models) in the body; implementation predicates in Appendix G; no code URL in body.

Observed behavior

Sanitize-only degrades outcomes below the undefended baseline for every tested model. Claude Opus 4.5: TS falls from 46.88% (no defense) to 26.56%; Grok 4 Fast: AS rises from 56.25% to 68.75%. The sanitizer removes compromise-indicator strings that the model relied on for correct severity assessment, while leaving the adversarial severity influence unconstrained — destroying evidence without constraining the corrupted decision.

Expected behavior

A defense intervention should not reduce task success below the undefended baseline. At minimum, removing potential injection text should not worsen severity accuracy; ideally, it should raise task success by eliminating adversarial control cues while preserving legitimate IOC and severity-relevant context.

Reproducibility

medium

Threat model

SOC operators who deploy a generic prompt-sanitization layer on their LLM triage agent — a plausible, well-intentioned hardening step — may inadvertently create higher attack success rates than running the model undefended. This is a false-assurance failure: defenders gain a false sense of security while adversaries benefit from reduced contextual evidence in the model's input.

Novelty

Demonstrates a counterintuitive defense inversion: task-agnostic evidence removal actively harms robustness by destroying legitimate severity signals faster than it removes adversarial ones — a failure pattern not documented in prior prompt-injection defense literature.

Source

Triage notes (auto)

  • paperType: red-team-vuln
  • estimatedCaseCount: 2
  • triage reason: Characterizes and demonstrates indirect prompt injection attacks against blue-team LLM agents with multiple attack variants (explicit, stealth, multi-hop, persistent); shows how malicious evidence propagates through SOC decision pipelines with reproducible attack-defense evaluation.
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