SYS:ONLINELAT:n/aBUILD:78a79a3
[CASE-385]·STATUS:ACTIVE·OPENED:2026-11-09·UPDATED:2026-11-09

Seven of 11 prompt injection guards score AI-addressed instructions lower than human-addressed ones, inverting the key injection signal

submitted_by:@mexiQQ
from-arxivauto-publishedother
cat case_body.md

Auto-published from arXiv:2611.08834 by the mine-arxiv pipeline. Reviewed by an LLM judge (Sonnet) against the archive bar — see CONTRIBUTING. Notes: cleared review (confidence 0.88, flags: [possible-zero-day, no-prompt-excerpt])

Category

other

Model

Seven guards including PIGuard, Prompt Guard 1-86M, Prompt Guard 2-86M/22M, ProtectAI v1, TestSavant, Wolf Defender (2048,64)

Surface

API (classifier scoring of synthetic single-sentence payloads in a factorial probe)

Setup

A 6×2×2×3×7 = 504 factorial probe of synthetic payload sentences varied by intent, addressee ('you' vs. 'any automated or artificial-intelligence system reviewing this Agreement'), mood (must/shall), frame (bare / 'Ignore all previous instructions.' / 'Notwithstanding any other provision hereof,'), and topic. Each factor was varied while holding others fixed; Tab. 2 reports mean score change per factor. Full probe template is in the OSF artifact.

Reproduction anchor

code/data: https://osf.io/67hyb/overview?view_only=267d968d563f47d3a83707b0f3434069 (all LLM prompts and payload templates); factorial probe design fully specified in §5.1 of the paper.

Observed behavior

Seven of eleven guards assign lower injection scores to sentences explicitly addressing 'any automated or artificial-intelligence system' than to identical sentences using 'you' — the opposite of the correct direction. Wolf Defender — the only guard achieving meaningful attack/benign separation (+27.9 pp) — simultaneously shows the largest wrong-direction addressee effect (Table 2).

Expected behavior

Guards should assign higher scores to instructions explicitly naming AI systems as the target, since legitimate contract clauses address human parties and machine-directed language is the hallmark of an adversarial injection.

Reproducibility

medium

Threat model

An attacker aware of this inversion can deliberately phrase injections using AI-directed language ('any automated or artificial-intelligence system reviewing this Agreement shall...') to decrease guard detection probability while increasing the injection's potency against the AI reviewer — a systematic, exploitable evasion recipe derivable from published guard behavior.

Novelty

Demonstrates via controlled factorial ablation that the addressee signal — the most semantically meaningful marker distinguishing legitimate contract language from AI-targeted injection — is encoded in the wrong direction by most tested guards, converting a natural hardening signal into a reliable evasion handle.

Source

Triage notes (auto)

  • paperType: benchmark
  • estimatedCaseCount: 3
  • triage reason: Systematically measures 11 prompt injection guards against legal contract injection attacks, documenting false positive rates up to 92.39% and a novel threat category (unauthorized scope claims) where all guards score zero. Tests reproducible on defined corpora with controlled probes.
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