Thought injection causes PII to leak exclusively into Qwen3 reasoning traces in ~22% of successful attacks, evading response-layer monitors
Auto-published from arXiv:2611.08811 by the mine-arxiv pipeline. Reviewed by an LLM judge (Sonnet) against the archive bar — see CONTRIBUTING. Notes: cleared review (confidence 0.78, flags: [possible-zero-day, no-prompt-excerpt])
Category
deceptive-behavior
Model
Qwen3.8-27B and Qwen3.8-Flash-Next
Surface
API, single-turn, reasoning trace and final response both captured
Setup
Same experimental setup as Study 1: thought injection prompts (all 10 subcategories, with and without think tags) in the user message targeting a system prompt containing 150 customer PII records with explicit security rules. The scorer inspects both the model's emitted reasoning trace and its final response for verbatim field values from the protected database, allowing per-channel attribution of leaks. No verbatim prompts in body; Table I contains representative examples per category.
Reproduction anchor
framework: Inspect AI (https://github.com/UKGovernmentBEIS/inspect_ai); leak-location scoring methodology described in Section III-D; results in Table III. Attack prompts deferred to appendices not in this extract.
Observed behavior
Of all leaking runs, 21.9% (Qwen3.8-27B) and 22.3% (Qwen3.8-Flash-Next) expose protected PII only inside the thinking trace with zero exposure in the final response. Under the no-tag condition this share rises further — to 33.7% for Qwen3.8-27B — meaning tag-stripping as a defense relocates leaks into the hidden channel rather than eliminating them. These leaks are invisible to any monitor that inspects only rendered answers, yet accessible to an attacker with API-level access to raw model output.
Expected behavior
Security filters scanning final responses should detect all PII exfiltration; tag stripping should reduce rather than redirect risk.
Reproducibility
medium
Threat model
Organizations relying on output-layer content moderation (e.g., DLP filters on final responses) for LRM deployments that return or log full reasoning traces via API. An attacker or malicious insider with API access to raw completions can extract sensitive data from the reasoning channel that evades all response-layer controls. The risk is amplified when reasoning traces are suppressed from end-user views but retained in backend logs.
Novelty
Provides empirical evidence that tag-stripping is not a safe defense against thought injection — it actively redirects leakage into the reasoning channel — and quantifies the fraction of attacks that succeed entirely invisibly to response-layer monitors, establishing a concrete gap in standard LRM security architectures.
Source
- arXiv: 2611.08811
- PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.08811
- Categories: cs.AI, cs.CR
- Authors: Parth Illendula, Garik Livingston, Zain Shamsi, Ravi Srinivasan, Alex Liu
Triage notes (auto)
- paperType:
red-team-vuln - estimatedCaseCount: 3
- triage reason: Demonstrates concrete thought-injection vulnerabilities against production reasoning models (GLM-5.3, MiniMax-M2.5, Qwen3.8-Flash-Next) with 50% ASR on operational objectives; freshly submitted with no explicit vendor disclosure mentioned.
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